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Abstract: 
Conflictive social interactions are associated with the attribution of responsibility for our 
negative experiences to the other, and with a distant social perception of the other. When 
we meditate we acquire skills related to thought that allow us to observe how we perceive 
and signify interaction with the other, which distances us from the response to the 
meaning of this perception. This way of attending to events can have a negative effect on 
the tendency to make dispositional attributions, which are generally more conflictive, 
since the person making the attribution blames the other for the unpleasant situation he or 
she is experiencing. For this reason, the associated practice of meditation may affect 
social interactions by reducing conflict. The relationship between infrequent meditation, 
associated to the development of self-observation, with the locus of attribution for an 
unpleasant event, the perception of anger with oneself, and the social distance from the 
outgroup was analysed using a sample of 229 individuals (118 non-meditators and 111 
unspecific meditators). Results show that meditation has the effect of reducing 
dispositional attributions, perception of anger, and social distance, and provide evidence 
for the moderating effect of self-observation ability. 
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Introduction 
The practice of mindfulness meditation can have numerous effects on the way people 
process information and react emotionally in their social interactions. Meditation 
mindfulness requires both the ability to anchor one's attention on what is occurring, and 
the ability to intentionally switch attention from one aspect of the experience to another 
(Keng, S.L.; Smoski, M.J. & Robins, C.J., 2011). Mindfulness meditators learn to 
observe thoughts, to avoid immediate responses to impulses arising from experiences, to 
distance themselves from their perception of themselves and of the other, or to experience 
interactions without judgement. In sum, the mindfulness meditator develops a capacity to 
create distance between the observation of what he or she experiences and the response to 
the experience (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Brown, Ryan & Creswell, 
2007; Williams, 2010). Meditation can develop the individual’s ability to interact with his 
or her environment, by bringing him or her closer to the experience with a fundamental 
attitude of respect and acceptance, generating more understanding responses to what is 
happening at that moment. The ability to self-observe the internal processes that generate 
these responses might moderate the effect of meditation on interaction responses. Three 
responses associated to social interaction may be particularly sensitive to meditation and 
self-observation: 1) attribution of responsibility for harm to a third party; 2) the subjective 
perception of anger in a conflictive situation, and 3) the psychological distance from 
members of the outgroup. 
Mindfulness is an efficient way to attain well-being and personal health benefits, as 
various training programmes have shown (e.g., Broderick, 2005; Brown & Ryan, 2003; 
Shapiro, Brown & Biegel, 2007). Mindfulness can be defined as an attentional state of mind 
by which cognitive processes interact with emotional processes to receive, perceive and manage 
information. It is a psychological state characterized by an open mind to present events. Kabat-
Zinn (1994: 4) described it as “paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and 
nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment”. Two aspects stand out: 1. 
The state of mindfulness is characterized by an awareness of the internal and external sensory and 
cognitive experience of the present moment. 2. This awareness leads to simply acknowledge and 
examine, without any judgment, elaboration, or emotional reaction to whatever arises. It includes 
elements of attention-regulation mechanisms and orientation to experience characterized by 
openness, acceptance, and nonjudgmentalism (Bishop, 2002; Bishop, et al. 2004; Brown & Ryan, 
2004; Hayes & Shenk, 2004). Mindfulness is not a passive ability as it is an active cognitive 
ability in which conscious attention to the present moment allows the observer to retain 
and capture the object being observed without the filters of memory or expectation 
(Dreyfus, 2011). This capacity to be mindful, paying attention to the present moment may be a 
disposition or a temporal condition (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer & Toney, 2006). 
Regardless of the degree of dispositional features, the tool that has proven to be most effective for 
the development of mindfulness is meditation, a practice extended in the West in recent years 
without adherence to religious beliefs (Duerr, 2004; Hart, 2007; Kabat-Zinn, 1996). Since 
meditation is a mind-calming tool that ultimately results in mindfulness both terms tend to be 
merged in one concept; it must be highlighted, however, that mindful dispositions do not require 
the practice of meditation to be activated although they can be deepened by this practice.  
The present study investigates social interaction responses as a function of 
meditation. One way in which meditation may affect social interaction responses is in the 
effect it has on the interpretation of perceived situations. Although there are variations in 
meditation techniques (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne & Davidson, 2008) and their effects 
(Erisman & Roemer, 2010), all types of meditation monitor and regulate internal 
cognitive processes. Meditation could therefore intervene in our interpretation of 
interactions with others, through a more compassionate internal perception of the 
experience, thus reducing conflict in the social interaction. Some studies find evidence 
that meditation enhances a compassionate perception of interaction with the other (e.g. 
Lutz, Greischar, Rawling, Ricard & Davidson, 2004; Siegel, 2007) and encourages 
attitudes of proximity to the other (e.g. Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002). 
The development of self-observation appears to derive from the practice of 
meditation and should therefore have a clear association with it. Baer Smith, Hopkins, 
Krietemeyer and Toney (2006) point out that self-observation is particularly sensitive to 
the effect of meditation. Self-observation is one of the main factors of mindfulness (Baer 
et al., 2006). Nowadays the concepts of meditation and mindfulness tend to be used 
somewhat interchangeably. However, there are differences; roughly explained, 
meditation is sustaining focus on a very simple stimulus (such as breath) and mindfulness 
is observing the flow of all simple stimuli without thoughts or worry (Smith, 2005). The 
state of mindfulness allows for observing mental responses to the present moment. The 
mindfulness-meditation technique consists of allowing sensations and thoughts to arise,  
paying attention what happens in the present without censure. Self-observation is 
therefore a way of meditating and also a result of meditation. Training in self-observation 
enables the person to focus the attention of the experiences on internal processes, thus 
strengthening the effect of meditation on social interaction responses. 
The regulation of internal processes can affect interaction responses. One 
expression of this association can be seen in the way we explain events. Attribution 
theory states that when we try to understand a situation, particularly when it is painful or 
frustrating, the first thing we do is to make a judgement (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1985). 
However, we do not usually consider the judgement to be anything different from fact. 
Thus, when we attribute responsibility for our suffering to others, it becomes more of a 
fact in that we do not see how this has occurred. This type of attribution is potentially 
more aggressive, since it can cause greater harm and pain (Leary et al., 1998; Vangelisti 
& Young, 2000; Young, 2004). When attribution is more generally made to the situation, 
the cause of the threat is less defined, which obliges us to observe more closely what is 
happening and the response we should make. 
The appropriate response, such as anger, arises more easily in people with 
dispositional attributions. When the cause of a frustrating situation is attributed to an 
actor, anger towards that actor tends to increase more than when the cause of the 
frustration is attributed to the situation (Weiner, 1993, 1995). Hence, judging situations as 
dispositional is frequently accompanied by negative emotional reactions that intensify the 
conflict in the interaction. When meditation leads to the absence of reactivity, the person 
is becoming less conflictive (Langer, 1983, 1997).  
Conflictive social interactions require that responsibility for our negative 
experiences be attributed to the other, together with a distanced social perception of the 
other. When we meditate we can develop a basic attitude of respect and acceptance of all 
individuals, subsumed within a positive frame of mind, that does not involve rejection 
(e.g. Dreyfuss, 2011; Garland, Gaylord & Park,, 2009; Hill & Updegraff, 2012; Kabat-
Zinn, 1990; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross & Gabrieli, 2006). Distance from the other is 
lessened if we do not judge and if we attend to who the other is from our internal state. 
Similarly, the development of self-observation, of realising how we tend to reject the 
other, could bring others closer to ourselves. Two important studies in the field of 
cooperation, Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat & Smith (1994) and Hoffman, McCabe, &  
Smith (1996), have shown how perceived social distance increases with selfish attitudes 
and anonymity. Furthermore, social distance is related to the image one has of oneself. 
According to Sheriff and Sheriff (1975), the members of a group that perceives itself as 
dominant in a relationship will maintain a greater social distance from outgroups, which 
are perceived as inferior. Meditation can help people to discriminate between these 
mental representations and the external event, and increase the acceptance of the image 
they have of their own experience, without pre-judgements.  
The aim of this paper is to study the relationship meditation has in socio-cognitive 
responses of responsibility attribution, the subjective perception of anger and the 
perception of social distance from the outgroup. The study also analyses the moderating 
role of self-observation in these responses. These aims lead us to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. People who have meditated for more than 140 hours and fewer than 500 
hours, have a more situational than dispositional attributional style. 
Hypothesis 2. People who have not meditated have a more dispositional than situational 
attributional style. 
Hypothesis 3. People who have meditated have significantly higher self-observation 
scores, and lower scores in subjective perception of anger and social distance from the 
outgroup than those who have not meditated. 
Hypothesis 4. Self-observation has a moderating effect on meditation. The effect of 
meditation on social interaction will be significantly more acute in people with high self-
observation scores.  
Method 
Participants 
Of the 229 participants in this study, 37.6% were aged between 18 and 24 years, 
36.2% between 25 and 35 years, and 25.8% were over the age of 35. The total number of 
men was 59 (25.8%) and women, 169 (73.8%). Educational levels were divided as 
follows: primary (3.5%), secondary (6.1%) and university (90%). Of the total, 111 
(48.5%) people had meditation experience and 118 (51.5%) had never meditated.  
Procedure 
Meditators were selected through an announcement posted in the university, 
calling for people with some meditation experience to take part in research related to their 
state of mind. People who responded to the announcement then completed a short survey 
on their experience of meditation. Those selected a) responded that they meditated in 
some form, b) that they did so somewhat unsystematically, without following any 
specific discipline, and c) their total experience of meditation was more than 140 hours, 
but fewer than 500 hours. The number of hours was chosen arbitrarily, as it was 
considered to guarantee that those chosen were not experienced meditators. 
Non-meditators were chosen at random by means of a survey at the university 
entrance. The survey opened with a question about meditation experience in order to 
identify people who had never meditated. 
Instruments 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts: 
Meditation: 1. Irregular meditator, unspecific (N=111): participants were asked to 
estimate the total time they had spent meditating. Those selected reported having 
meditated for more than 140 hours and fewer than 500 hours. The mean estimated time 
spent meditating was 320.09 hours (SD=225.71).  
2. Non-meditator. Individuals who had never meditated (N=118). 
Self-observation: we used the ‘observe’ factor (M =5.802, SD =1.651; α =.863) 
from Baer et al.’s Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (2006). These authors state that 
the five facets can be used independently of the general questionnaire. Respondents 
answered on a 9-point Likert-type scale (1 = never or very rarely true, 9 = very often or 
always true).  
Level of self-observation: The self-observation variable was dichotomised into 
high and low self-observation, taking the mean self-observation level of the study 
participants as a reference (M=5.802). High self-observation participants were those with 
self-observation scores of 5.81 and above (N=111; 48.5%; M= 7.165; SD.=.871), whereas 
low self-observation participants had scores from 1 to 5.8 (N=118; 51.5%; M=4.520; 
SD=1.086) 
Attributional style. Participants were asked to read the description of a situation in 
which an accident had occurred: “You leave the house in the morning with your son or 
daughter (or younger brother or sister) and you are late for school. You cross the street. A 
car knocks you over. You didn’t see it, you didn’t have time to react. It seemed to speed 
off, you didn’t have time …. The child is lying on the floor bleeding.” Faced with this 
situation, participants were asked to give an open response to the question ‘What do you 
think happened?’ Responses were divided into three categories: 1. External dispositional 
attribution, in which the observer directly blames the actor (e.g. ‘the driver was a bit 
crazy. He must have had a bad night’; ‘the person driving the car was drunk, had been 
taking drugs, or he had done something illegal, something that made him drive off’); 2. 
Situational attribution, in which the observer is unclear as to who was ultimately to blame 
for the accident (e.g. ‘we were running late so we didn’t see the car which was going too 
fast and ran us over’; ‘we crossed the road in a hurry, practically without looking. The 
driver didn’t see us, and we didn’t see him either’; ‘maybe he didn’t see us, he must have 
been worried, I wasn’t concentrating, I should have left home earlier, he got scared’); 3. 
Internal dispositional attribution, in which the observer considers that his or her actions 
are to blame for the accident (‘I wasn’t concentrating when I crossed the street and I 
didn’t see the car coming towards us’; ‘I was in a hurry and I acted rashly. We crossed 
without paying proper attention’). The authors classified the responses into one of the 
three categories independently of each other. After this initial phase, each analyst’s 
solutions were paired up. The solutions that coincided were categorised directly, 
accounting for 60% of the responses. The total number of questionnaire respondents with 
external dispositional responses was N= 54, with situational responses N= 175, and with 
internal dispositional responses N= 12. Given that the aim of the study was to compare 
external dispositional responses to the actor with situational responses, the internal 
dispositional responses were eliminated from the study. Hence, two categories remained 
in this variable: 1. External dispositional attribution (N=54); 2. Situational attribution 
(N=175). 
Subjective perception of anger: a Likert-type scale (1= very angry) to (9= not at all 
angry) was used to measure the anger the person felt when faced with the situation 
described in the attributional style variable (M =3.253; SD =2.418). Using the EFFQ 
Reactivity scale to validate the anger response with a reactive response to the dilemma, 
we performed a correlation between the two to analyze possible convergence in the 
response. We find a significant correlation between Reactivity and Anger in the overall 
sample (r=.503; p<.001), in the meditador sample (r=.514; p<.001), and in the non-
meditator sample (r=.392; p=.024). The single item subjective measure of anger is 
therefore shown to behave similarly to a reactive response in the area of conscious 
attention. 
Social distance: we evaluated the perceived distance between the participant and a 
social group using the Bogardus social distance scale (1947). This scale, originally 
designed to measure the level of contact desired with members of other groups, considers 
willingness to accept the other at various levels of closeness to indicate social distance 
from social groups. According to Biernat and Crandall (1993), it is one of the most useful 
and simple instruments to measure prejudice against outgroups. The scale asked 
participants to evaluate their degree of acceptance of a person from a threatening group (a 
score of one indicated no social distance, with full acceptance of the person from the 
threatening group; a score of nine indicated the greatest social distance). The respondents 
explored their willingness to be close to the supposedly threatening person, using five 
items, each one representing a greater social closeness to the respondent. The Bogardus 
social distance scale is a cumulative scale, since the agreement with any item implies 
agreement with all preceding items. In this study we used five items of closeness, from 
greatest to least social distance. The first item on our scale read as follows: ‘think of the 
type of person that you least identify with, whether from another ethnic group or religion 
or a person with other values. Would you be happy …… (respond on a scale from 1 (NO) 
to 9 (YES)), 1. to have him/her as a visitor in your city?, 2. to have him/her as a 
neighbour in the same neighbourhood?, 3. to have him/her as a neighbour in the same 
building?, 4. to have him/her as a friend?, 5. to marry the person or have your son or 
daughter marry him/her?’ A compound score of social distance was obtained by totalling 
the scores from each item from the scale of 1 (greatest social distance) to 9 (least social 
distance) and dividing the result by 5 (M=4.083; SD=1.768). 
Results 
The aim of the study was to analyse the effect of irregular meditation on 
attributional style, anger response and social distance. We also analysed the role of self-
observation in meditation and its effect on these social interaction responses.  
The results were obtained by first conducting a chi-square test for the meditation 
experience variable and the demographic variables, to uncover any bias in the age, sex or 
educational groups making up the sample. The χ 2 test revealed no differences between 
educational level and meditation experience or otherwise (χ2= 4.110; p= .128, df= 2), nor 
in relation to gender (χ2= 2.806; p=.094; df=2). However, differences were found in the 
age variable (χ2= 16.432; p<.001; df=2). Empirical frequency of meditators and non-
meditators according to age is reported in Table 1. Older people are more likely to 
meditate than younger people (Table 1). 
____________________________________ 
     Insert table 1 
___________________________________ 
As a previous stage, we tested the relationship between attributive style, anger 
responses and social distance. We performed an ANOVA for respondents who had made 
dispositional attributions, and those who had made situational attributions, in relation to 
anger and social distance (Table 2). The results indicate that the situational attributional 
style is more significantly related to a lower anger response and less social distance.  
___________________________________ 
     Insert table 2 
___________________________________ 
We then tested the research hypotheses by analysing the relationship of meditation 
experience with the dependent variables. First, the relation between meditation and 
attributional style was tested with a χ2 analysis (χ2 =4.99; p=.026; df=1). The results 
indicated that the most frequent attributional response among the group of meditators was 
situational attribution (hypothesis 1). Among the non-meditators, the dispositional 
attributional style was more frequent than among the meditators (hypothesis 2) (Table 1).  
Secondly, we performed ANOVAs to establish the effect that meditational 
experience or lack of experience has on anger response and social distance, and self-
observation (hypothesis 3) (Table 2). The results show that the meditational experience is 
associated with both higher self-observation scores and less intense subjective perception 
of anger, and less social distance from threatening others.  
Hypothesis 4, which predicted a moderating effect of self-observation on 
meditation, was tested in two stages. For each group (meditators and non-meditators) we 
first analysed the relationship between level of self-observation and attributional style, by 
performing a chi-square test. This analysis revealed no relationship between self-
observation and attributional style in the case of non-meditators (χ2 =.100; p=.752; df=1); 
however, this relationship was significant in the case of the meditator group (χ2 =8.510; 
p=.004; df=1). The situational attributional style was more frequent among those with 
high self-observation scores, whereas in the group with lower self-observation scores the 
dispositional style was more frequent (Table 3). 
____________________________________ 
     Insert table 3 
___________________________________ 
Secondly we performed an ANOVA for each group (meditators and non-
meditators) on subjective perception of anger and social distance. Our findings indicate 
that self-observation moderates the effects of meditation on social interaction. High self-
observation intensifies the reduction of social distance in the meditator group, but 
subjective perception of anger does not change among these participants. In contrast, high 
self-observation in the non-meditator group lowered scores for subjective perception of 
anger, but did not affect social distance results (Table 4).   
____________________________________ 
     Insert Table 4 
___________________________________ 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to explore the relationship between meditation 
and response to conflictive social situations, as well as the effect associated with self-
observation ability. The results showed that both meditation and development of self-
observation are tools that can influence conflictive interactions by reducing levels of 
conflict.  
Our results show that experience of meditation is associated with a higher 
frequency of situational attribution. Moreover, participants who made dispositional 
attributions demonstrated higher levels of anger and greater social distance. Meditation 
appears to regulate the internal processes of explaining the external experience, by 
reducing the conflictive potential in the response. The results appear to confirm a link 
between meditation and the activation of responses that involve lower intergroup 
aggression. Meditators tend to perceive reality less aggressively, which is reflected in the 
perception of their emotional response. They also registered lower levels of rejection 
towards members of the outgroup.  
Meditation appears to have an even greater effect on certain aspects of interaction 
when it is associated with higher levels of self-observation. Specifically, the tendency of 
meditators to make situational attributions is moderated by their self-observation ability. 
Self-observation increases the frequency of the response as compared with non-
meditators, or meditators with low self-observation. In addition, self-observation 
intensifies the effect meditation has of reducing social distance. Both attributional style 
and social distance are cognitive responses. These results appear to support previous 
evidence indicating that meditation encourages a more compassionate view of the other, 
and fosters acceptance (e.g. Lutz, Greischar, Rawling, Ricard & Davidson, 2004; Segal, 
Williams, Teasdale, 2002; Siegel ,2007).  
In contrast, individuals who had not meditated, but had high self-observation 
scores, showed lower levels of anger than those with low scores. Self-observation 
improves the effect of reducing subjective perception of anger among non-meditators. 
This begs the question of why self-observation moderates the effect among non-
meditators in emotional responses, and among meditators in cognitive responses. Self-
observation is a facet of full attention, and in people who have not learned to develop the 
set of full attention skills through meditation, self-observation may have the effect of 
reducing impulsivity. Therefore, self-observation would not have an additional effect on 
the emotional response among people with meditation experience. Based on this 
hypothesis, self-observation ability is not enough on its own to affect the cognitive 
processes involved in social interaction, although it does so when it interacts with 
meditation. In other words, perhaps the effect of self-observation on cognitive processes 
as a causal explanation of a more dispositional style and lower social distance, as 
observed in the meditator group, may be due to the fact that self-observation acts in 
individuals who have learned to reduce their negative emotional responses. Given that 
self-observation is a cognitive skill in recognising internal processes, it might be the case 
that it has a positive effect on anger in non-meditators, because they are not trained to 
contain their emotional responses. The size of the effect is small in attributional style 
(.013-.029), as is the effect of meditation experience (.021-.097). Again the size of the 
effect is small (.010-.075), as is the effect of meditation experience (.021-.097). Such 
small effects both from table 2 and the 4, indicate little practical relevance of the results. 
However, considering the relative novelty of the study area, suggest the need to further 
explore theoretical these variables overcoming the limitations of this study. Further in-
depth research is required to explore whether meditation can bring members of different 
social groups closer together at a cognitive level, enabling greater mutual acceptance in 
itself, or through the development of self-observation or the reduction of emotional 
reactions.  
The findings from this study allow us to suggest that social relations can be 
improved through meditation. It is not an isolated effect; mindfulness has been shown to 
help in facing strong emotional states and in resolving interpersonal conflicts (Horton-
Deutsch & Horton, 2003), as well as increasing empathy (Dekeyser, Raes, Leijsen, 
Leysen&Dewulff, 2008). Peters et al. (2011) demonstrate that self-consciousness 
encourages more regulated behaviour, with fewer negative effects. Siegel (2007) suggests 
that there are neural systems which support experiences of synchronisation and resonance 
with other people. These systems become self-reflexive with the practice of mindfulness, 
developing empathy, understanding and love for ourselves and our experience (Siegel, 
2007).  
In summary, responses that could derive in more aggressive interactions from 
individuals with more meditation experience were affected in such a way that the 
aggression of the experience was lower. It should be noted that these differences were 
observed a group of people with a limited and unsystematic experience of meditation. 
The results presented in this study suggest that meditation has the potential to facilitate 
less aggressive and conflictive social interactions. These effects can be moderated by the 
development of self-observation. Future research, as noted by Langer (1997), could 
further explore the idea that meditation and/or the development of mindfulness skills 
might reduce the automatic responses associated with conflictive social interactions.  
Study limitations and future research lines  
Like all studies, this one has limitations. The limitations of this study are 
essentially related to the sample. Future research might usefully study experienced 
meditators in order to evaluate the possible effect of meditation experience on the various 
attribution responses. Future studies could also include more explanatory variables for the 
concept of mindfulness. This would extend understanding and more accurately test the 
extent to which the construct that delimits the concept of mindfulness affects the response 
of anger and social distance according to attributional style. The correlational nature of 
the study is also a limitation. Future studies might contribute more precise information by 
exploring the meditation experience with behavioural or physiological variables of 
mindfulness. 
One of the most comprehensive measures of mindfulness is the Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) with five factors—Observing, Describing, Acting 
with awareness, Non-judging, and Non-reactivity. Hierarchical confirmatory factor 
analyses, however, have suggested that only four of the FFMQ factors (i.e. all except 
Observing) were components of an overall mindfulness construct. However, studies that 
compare meditators and non-meditators have shown that mindfulness is related to high 
levels of Observing (Lilja, Lundh, Josefsson, Falkenström, 2013). This manuscript 
presents data for only one facet of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire. The 
Observing facet has been shown to function differentially in meditators vs non-meditators 
(Baer et al., 2008). The scales authors suggest that this is likely due to different 
interpretations of the facet depending on meditation experience. The different way of 
interpreting the items indicates that meditators and non-meditators perceive the meaning 
of self-observation differently. This is probably because their internal experience of this 
facet is different, which affects the way in which what they observe is represented. The 
Observing facet can moderate the direct effect of meditator or non-meditator status on the 
cognitive responses of the study. This moderator aspect does not arise with the other 
facets, since their function is similar in both groups. The changes observed in the rest of 
the EEFQ questionnaire facets concern the intensity in the development of the skill, but 
there is no evidence that this affects the function of these facets on other relational or 
psychological aspects. Although this facet can be used independently, the absence of the 
Acting with Awareness facet is particularly relevant, especially given previous findings 
demonstrating the high correlation between the Acting with Awareness facet and 
disinhibited and aggressive behavior and the importance of self-awareness in the 
discussion. In studies that aim to explore the differences in the psychosocial behavior of 
meditators and non-meditators, the facets not considered here should be included.  
The use of a single item for attributional style, without any previously established 
instruments for validation of this  method, and single item measures for anger is   
questionable, especially when numerous well-validated, multi-item questionnaires for 
these constructs exist. In addition, the attributional style measure does not appear to be 
very accurate. The majority of participants in this study responded with situational 
attribution, which suggests that the measure was not powerful enough to detect the 
differences in attributional style. The use of more valid questionnaires should solve this 
issue. 
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Table 1  
Frequency of individuals with and without meditation experience by age and by 
attributional style 
  AGE 
 
 
  18-24 
years 
25-35 
years 
> 35 
years      
TOTAL 
With 
Meditation 
Experience  
Count 
Expected frequency 
Standardised residuals 
28 
41.5 
-2.1 
43 
40 
.5 
39 
28.5 
2.0        
111 
 
      
Without  
Meditation 
Experience 
Count 
Expected frequency 
Standardised residuals 
58 
44.5 
2.0 
40 
43 
-.5 
20 
30.5 
-1.9 
118 
      
TOTALS*  86 83 59 229 
  ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE  
     
   DISPOSITIONAL SITUATIONAL TOTAL 
With 
Meditation 
Experience  
Count 
Expected frequency 
Standardised 
residuals 
 
19 
26.2 
-1.4 
92 
84.8 
.8 
111 
 
Without  
Meditation 
Experience 
 
Count 
Expected frequency 
Standardised 
residuals 
 
 
35 
27.8 
1.4 
 
83 
90.2 
-.8 
 
118 
 
TOTALS** 
 
 
 
54 
 
175 
 
229 
* χ2= 16.432, p<.001, df.=2;  **χ2 =4.99, p=.026, df =1 
 
 
  
Table 2 
Analysis of variance for attributive style and experience with meditation 
Variables  N Mean SD F d
 
ATTRIBUTIVE 
STYLE 
     
 
 
Self-observation 
 
Dispositional 
Situational 
All 
 
54 
175 
229 
 
5.463 
5.907 
5.802 
 
1.708 
1.624 
1.651 
 
 
 
3.012 
 
 
 
.013 
Anger 
Dispositional 
Situational 
All 
54 
175 
229 
2.519 
3.480 
3.253 
2.152 
2.456 
2.418 
 
 
 6.68** 
 
 
 
.029 
Social distance  
Dispositional 54 3.577 1.712   
Situational 175 4.239 1.760   
All 229 4.083 1.767 5.91*   .025 
 
EXPERIENCE 
WITH 
MEDITATION 
    
 
 
Self-observation 
Without 
experience 
With 
experience 
All 
     
    118 
 
    111 
    229 
 
5.304 
 
6.332 
5.802 
 
1.723 
 
1.395 
1.651 
 
 
 
 
    24.450*** 
 
 
 
 
  .097 
Anger 
Without 
experience 
With 
experience 
All 
 
    111 
 
    118 
    229 
 
3.688 
 
2.847 
3.253 
 
2.324 
 
2.444 
2.418 
 
 
 
 
     7.037** 
 
 
 
 
.030 
Social distance  
Without 
experience 
With 
experience 
All 
 
    111 
 
    118 
    229 
 
4.347 
 
3.835 
4.083 
 
1.732 
 
1.772 
1.768 
 
 
 
 
     4.888* 
 
 
 
 
  
.021 
*p< .05  **p< .01 ***p< .001
  
 
Table 3 
Frequency of individuals with high and low self-observation scores by 
attributional style in the meditator group 
 
  ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE  
     
   DISPOSITIONAL SITUATIONAL TOTAL 
High Self-
observation 
Count 
Expected frequency 
Standardised residuals 
 
6 
11.6 
-1.7 
62 
56.4 
.8 
68 
 
Low Self-
observation 
 
Count 
Expected frequency 
Standardised residuals 
 
 
13 
7.4 
2.1 
 
30 
35.6 
-.9 
 
43 
 
TOTALS 
 
 
 
19 
 
92 
 
111 
χ2 =8.510, p=.004, df =1 
Table 4 
Analysis of variance according to meditation experience and level of self-observation for 
anger and social distance  
Variables  N Mean SD F d 
MEDITATORS       
Anger 
 
 
High self-
observation 
Low self-
observation 
 
Total 
   
 68 
  
 43 
 
111 
 
3.912 
 
3.323 
 
3.685 
 
2.190 
 
2.504 
 
2.323 
 
 
 
 
 
1.687 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.015 
 
Social distance  
 
 
High self-
observation 
Low self-
observation 
 
Total 
   
68 
   
43 
 
111 
 
4.723 
 
3.753 
 
4.347 
 
1.724 
 
1.589 
 
1.722 
 
 
 
    
 
8.857** 
 
 
 
 
  
 
.075 
 
NON-
MEDITATORS 
     
 
Anger 
 
 
High self-
observation 
Low self-
observation 
 
Total 
 
43 
 
75 
 
118 
 
3.465 
 
2.493 
 
2.848 
 
2.729 
 
2.208 
 
2.447 
 
 
 
 
 
4.446* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.037 
 
Social distance  
 
 
High self-
observation 
Low self-
observation 
 
Total 
 
43 
 
75 
 
118 
 
4.066 
 
3.702 
 
4.835 
 
1.916 
 
1.683 
 
1.768 
 
 
 
 
 
1.156 
 
 
 
 
 
.010 
*p< .05;  **p< .01  
